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Abstract 
The inclusion of indigenous people into settler colonial cities is often highly conditional. 
Among middle-class Palestinian citizens of Israel in Tel Aviv, the invisibility of their ethno-
national identity is a precondition for their access to the city’s neoliberal economy and 
“liberal” lifestyle. To increase their mobility and socio-economic opportunities, they employ 
diverse tactics of immersive invisibility. Some aspire to be recognized as unmarked 
individuals and successful professionals in the hope to override the stigmatization of their 
identity. Although immersive invisibility does not change settler colonial exclusion, it 
determines how much individuals can achieve within existing parameters. Instead of 
transcending categorical difference and racialized exclusion, tactics of immersive invisibility 
reveal how neoliberal inclusion and exclusive settler colonial politics become entangled and 
constitute one another.  
Keywords: visibility, identity, urban inclusion, stigmatization, settler colonialism, Palestine, 
Israel 
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For Palestinians, the role of urban space in Tel Aviv is not to be seen. We came to Tel 
Aviv to be anonymous, as a collective. People don’t think about conquering Tel Aviv 
back…Palestinians in Tel Aviv don’t want to be marked. (…) but most reach a 
breaking point after two years, two years is enough to realize that they can’t blend in 
here. 
Muhammad, former Tel Aviv resident 
 
On a square below high-rising towers in the Israeli city of Tel Aviv, white-collar workers rush 
from their offices to the nearby train station. This “Diamond Exchange District” is one of the 
city’s major commercial areas, and this is where I meet the young engineer Azhar, a 
Palestinian citizen of Israel who works for a technology startup.1 She is dressed in smart office 
attire and, at first glance, nothing distinguishes her from the passing crowds. But then I 
recognize the golden necklace she is wearing, which says in shiny Arabic letters, filistin – 
Palestine. How, I ask, do her Jewish-Israeli colleagues react to this “statement”? Touching it 
for a second, as if surprised to re-discover it, she says: “I take it off when I enter the office, 
and when I leave the office, I put it on again. At work, politics don’t exist.” 
The law student Hisham used similar tactics. Initially, he had organized protests and 
commemorations of the Nakba, the Palestinian displacement of 1948, outside the Tel Aviv 
University campus: while students formed the letters N-A-K-B-A as a visible human chain 
against the backdrop of posters that showed former villages and displaced elders, agitated 
crowds of Jewish-Israeli nationalists held a counter-protest. Only one year later, however, 
Hisham applied for internships at legal firms in Tel Aviv, which required him to cultivate a 
different kind of image: censoring his Facebook profile and scaling back his public political 
activities, at least for the time being. Talking in his flat outside the university, Hisham 
suddenly walks off into his room and returns with a kuffiyeh, the Palestinian scarf, saying: “If I 
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go to university with this kuffiyeh, everybody will look at me and think I am a terrorist. We 
avoid wearing such symbols. If you want to live normal in this society, you learn to hide 
politics.” 
These practices indicate a common theme among stigmatized minorities: tactics of 
(in)visibility that involve displaying or hiding certain aspects of their identity. Similar 
dynamics have long been part of social relationships, as individuals keep some opinions and 
aspects of identity “backstage,” while putting others willfully into the front region (Goffman 
1990). Sometimes they do so as they are immerse into a potentially hostile environment, 
practicing a form of “social camouflage” not dissimilar from the disguise of camouflage 
animals or undercover agents (Brighenti and Castelli 2016). More than a mere function of 
social relationships, (in)visibility poses key problems for the constitution of intersubjective life 
(Brighenti 2010). Palestinians in Tel Aviv face a very particular “problem”: immersion into a 
settler colonial city whose residents and officials often perceive their ethno-national identity as 
unwanted and even threatening.  
Tactics of invisibility can help people access professional opportunities despite 
stigmatization, but the ability to do so is bound up with differences in class and identity. 
Wealthy urbanites can perform “conspicuous invisibility” to manage what others see and 
know about them, while cities often force the urban poor into the invisibility of informal 
spaces (Wacquant 2008, 240; Harms 2013). In a similar vein, minorities of gender, culture, 
and religion cannot always control what kind of visibility they command in public (Bayat 
2013, 17; Ghorashi 2010). Invisibility thus has very different qualities for different people. Its 
effects can be “self-voicing” just as they can be the effect of “being silenced” (Sözer 2014, 
10). 
The central factor that determines these qualities among Palestinians in Tel Aviv is 
citizenship or legal status. Unlike Azhar and Hisham, who are highly educated Palestinian 
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citizens of Israel, Palestinians from the occupied West Bank can only access this city on 
restrictive working permits. Israeli authorities often deny them on “security” grounds, forcing 
tens of thousands to enter illegally and hide underground. To them, invisibility is a form of 
being silenced. It has different qualities for Palestinian citizens of Israel, who do not need 
permits to take up residence or work in Tel Aviv and enjoy certain “privileges” – highly 
conditional, as we will see – that transform invisibility into a resource against stigmatization 
and exclusion. 
This is especially true of educated middle-class citizens who have the right background 
to be successful in Tel Aviv and the right aspirations to immerse temporarily into its spaces of 
employment and consumption. Like a dive under water, tactical invisibility allows them to 
immerse into the “neoliberal city under the illiberal state” (Bayat 2012). The problem is that 
they must keep on diving because this settler colonial city and the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict turn invisibility into a precondition for accessing the city’s “liberal” opportunities and 
lifestyle. 
Despite this seemingly uninviting reality, Tel Aviv’s booming economy has become an 
important center for the growing Palestinian middle class in Israel. Palestinian citizens of 
Israel (to whom I refer from here on as “Palestinians”), have long pushed into Jewish-Israeli 
cities, where housing, education, public services and jobs are better than in the often under-
funded Arab municipalities. Of the roughly 2,000 Palestinians who studied at Tel Aviv 
University at the time of research, many hoped to stay on in Tel Aviv after graduation. Others 
came from elsewhere in Israel to work as doctors, pharmacists, and software engineers, and 
some embraced the city’s lifestyle as artists and creative multi-jobbers. In one way or another, 
most made use of immersive invisibility to evade identity-referencing constraints: “constraint” 
because discrimination and stigmatization restrict their mobility and access, and “identity-
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referencing” because Jewish Israeli employers, landlords, or security guards often enforce 
restrictions on Palestinians. 
In response, people with the “wrong” group membership sometimes seek invisibility to 
participate quietly in cities and move around freely, rather than building a visible “case of 
identity” (Agier 2002, 333; Bayat 2013). Especially in a settler colonial city that fends off 
indigenous identity, urban outsiders employ tactics of compromise instead of “hidden 
resistance” that would subverts governing norms: these situational tactics allow them to react 
to shifting contexts and insinuate themselves into the “other’s place” fragmentarily, “without 
taking it over” (De Certeau 2011, xix; Scott 1990). Rather than reclaiming a city with grand 
collective strategies, tactics of invisibility allow stigmatized urban outsiders to make use of it 
from within. They are essentially tactics of immersive invisibility, temporarily employed to 
blend into an urban space from which their identity is categorically excluded. This offers an 
important alternative to visible articulations of, and claims to, urban citizenship as expressions 
of difference that seek to “transform the city” (Blokland et al. 2015). 
Unable to make identity-based claims for collective recognition, some indigenous 
urban minorities rather use the city to “transform” themselves and their lives, not by 
expressing difference, but by minimizing its visibility. As a situational tactic, immersive 
invisibility can pierce the illiberal shell of a city, but does it lead to sustainable inclusion and 
equal urban citizenship? 
Here it is one thing to merely hide what the dominant national majority perceives as 
unwanted, but another to hide what it perceives as threatening: as a symbol of indigeneity, 
forced displacement, and resistance, Palestinian national identity threatens the very legitimacy 
of Tel Aviv as an ostensibly liberal and purely Jewish modern city, the so-called “First 
Hebrew City.” One reason for this “threat” is that such national identity emphasizes the 
similarity and shared history of Palestinians within Israel and Palestinians living under Israeli 
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occupation or in exile. It would threaten the depoliticized space of urban immersion “without 
difference.” This means that Tel Aviv does not invite Palestinians to seek recognition and 
inclusion as people with an “authentic” indigenous culture, as multicultural settler colonial 
states like Australia do (Povinelli 2002). Tel Aviv is different in the sense that it developed an 
exclusive form of “ethno-liberalism” that categorically excludes Palestinian identity from any 
multicultural policy. Its settler colonial character and the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
serve as the basis for Palestinian citizens’ ethnoracial exclusion as “suspects” by definition 
(Lamont et al. 2016, 266; Khalidi 1997, 2).  
The settler colonial character of Tel Aviv’s ethno-liberalism  means that Azhar’s 
avoidance of “politics” is different from stigmatized minorities that simply keep a low profile 
in cities with failing cosmopolitanisms (Brink-Danan 2011). As citizens within a Jewish state, 
Palestinians are exiles at home who live with a condition of permanent political displacement, 
which create tensions between identity and space (Hackl 2017, 64). Such tension is 
exemplified by the “elephant in the room” they must “get rid of,” as psychologist Muna 
described the act of hiding her own necklace with Arabic lettering during therapy practice with 
Jewish patients. She added: “I didn’t want to bring it up; it gets really complicated and 
difficult.” 
This “it” is what Azhar referred to as “politics” and stands symbolically for aspects of 
Palestinian identity that unsettle Tel Aviv’s carefully crafted image and its ostensibly liberal 
character. Immersive invisibility answers crucial questions about how indigenous minorities 
and members of “enemy” groups in conflicts can benefit from living in large cities despite 
being categorically excluded. Despite their isolated nature, these invisible practices will not 
remain entirely without wider societal effects. As one Palestinian film student in Tel Aviv put 
it: “I am using their opportunities to be stronger against them.”  
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Unearthing Palestinian Tel Aviv 
The settler colonial city has often been described as a “white place” for indigenous exclusion 
par excellence, while indigenous urbanites are delegitimized as “inauthentic” people who 
assimilated and lost their culture (Gagné and Trépied 2016, 8–11). Palestinian tactics of 
immersive invisibility are neither a story of indigenous resistance nor one of assimilation. 
They seek pragmatic access to an urban space in response to a history of exclusion and 
dispossession, thereby negotiating a particular regime of settler colonial-liberal incorporation. 
Jewish residents and foreign visitors perceive the city largely as a likeable, innovative, and 
liberal Mediterranean metropolis. As Yonatan Mendel wrote in an essay entitled “Fantasising 
Israel” on the occasion of Tel Aviv’s centenary, this seemingly “most ‘liberal’ and ‘tolerant’ 
city in Israel, as its residents like to imagine it, is not only 100 years old, but almost 100 per 
cent Arab-free” (Mendel 2009). 
That this fantasy of an Arab-free modern city is rooted in the forced displacement of 
Palestinians became evident during an unusual tour of Tel Aviv in which I took part. 
“Welcome to Sheikh Munis,” the guide announced to the group of young Palestinian students 
gathered around him. Sheikh Munis – or al-Sheikh Muwannis – was once a Palestinian village 
and its land is now where Tel Aviv University stands. Developers turned the only remaining 
mansion, the Green House, into a social club for university employees. The tour led the 
students to places where their Palestinian history remained visible, if only barely, such as the 
abandoned graveyard hidden behind shrubbery in a park outside the seaside Hilton Hotel.2 
Further south on the seashore close to Jaffa, the former Palestinian port city, was once the al-
Manshiyya neighborhood, where the tour stopped to inspect an old stone building turned into 
an Israeli military museum, at the entrance of which one finds the inscription, “Etzel House: in 
memory of the liberators of Jaffa.” Etzel was a unit of the pre-state Jewish militia, which was 
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no liberator for the Palestinians. This symbolised how Israel overwrites the history of this 
urban space to keep the Palestinian narrative invisible. 
Ever since Jewish families gathered there in 1909 to lay the cornerstones of “the first 
modern, Hebrew city,” this urban project evolved in strong opposition to Palestine, intensified 
Jewish colonization, and instantiated the Jews as a people of modern space (Mann 2006, xii–
xiii; Levine 2005). While Israel became a state in 1948, the Palestinians experienced their 
national catastrophe, the Nakba: Jewish forces and armed conflict triggered the coerced flight 
and expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians from Israel’s newly captured territory; south of today’s 
Tel Aviv, Israel conquered Jaffa and drove out more than 90 percent of its Palestinian 
residents as part of the wider destruction of Palestinian urbanism (Robinson 2013; Rabinowitz 
and Monterescu 2007, 5). This paved the way for Tel Aviv to subsume Jaffa, gradually turning 
it into the gentrified neighbourhood it is today. The supersession of indigenous people 
facilitated the growth of the settler colonial city and permanently restructured the relation 
between indigenous people and urban space (Veracini 2010; Edmonds 2010). 
As it evolved into a neoliberal and European-style city, Tel Aviv began displaying the 
“dark side of modernism” (Yiftachel 1994): its planners and officials gradually erased 
Palestinian identity from the city’s surface. This forced urban invisibility of indigenous 
minorities forms part of what it means to be a nation whose territory has been largely taken 
away (Simpson 2014, 10). However, immersing into the city’s social and economic spaces 
allows individuals to respond to decades of state-sponsored marginalization proactively. 
The growing relevance of Tel Aviv among Palestinian citizens is not mirrored by 
official recognition. Merely recognizing their existence as a significant urban minority would 
upset the city’s very identity: in the words of former mayor Ron Khuldai, “Tel Aviv is not a 
mixed city. Indeed, we have a small Arab minority of four percent but it would be problematic 
to consider it as a mixed city” (Monterescu 2015, 126). Most Palestinians in the city do not 
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even appear in these official “four percent” because the city only counts Israeli citizens, 
among them only those who are residents, and consequently does not enumerate commuters, 
students, and many others.3 Maybe ironically, this overall non-recognition creates 
opportunities for apolitical immersion that benefits Palestinian citizens in search of success 
and urban life. 
This convergence of non-recognition and immersion is not without tensions. During 
the Nakba tour, standing where the Palestinian neighborhood al-Manshiyya once was, the 
guide showed around photographs of the former neighborhood before inviting the students to 
imagine a future return of Palestinian refugees. Equipped with flipchart paper they sat down in 
small groups in the parks along the seashore and conducted their exercise of imagining 
Palestinian refugees’ return, which somewhat contrasted their ambiguous lives in Israel. Well 
educated and mostly from middle-class families, they all studied at Israeli universities. As one 
group wrote its outline of return in Hebrew instead of Arabic, another participant quickly 
denounced them as the “shabak” group, referring to Israel’s Internal Security Agency 
notorious for blackmailing Palestinians into collaboration. Immersion into Tel Aviv, 
symbolized by the preference of Hebrew over Arabic, symbolizes for many a “loss” of 
national identity and integrity: activist circles sometimes refer to Palestinians in Tel Aviv as 
Aravivim – a term that combines the Hebrew words Aravim and Tel Avivim. Their immersion 
into Tel Aviv was criticized as early as 1929, when activists denounced Palestinians who 
visited the city’s nightclubs as people in pursuit of “foul objectives” (Azaryahu 2007, 47). 
Between settler colonial erasure and such controversy, the Palestinians in Tel Aviv 
have always coped with a dilemma of dual non-recognition: unrecognized within Tel Aviv as 
Palestinians, they are also unrecognized among Palestinians for blending into Tel Aviv. 
Indigenous minorities living in settler colonial cities often find themselves in such a double 
bind. They are not only structurally invisible to the settler state, but are simultaneously 
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marginalized by their own communities as a result of prevailing discourses about cultural [and 
political] authenticity (Barker and Gibbings 2016). Tactics of invisibility show how 
indigenous people can cope with this double bind of settler colonial cities, which requires 
careful balancing acts between urban immersion and sense of belonging and responsibility that 
contradict such immersion. 
I conducted fieldwork during a particular time of relative quiescence, interrupted only 
by the disruption of the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Palestinians at the time were political 
disillusioned about decades of failed peace processes and the deepening of Israel’s rule, some 
speaking of a “one-state condition” reality (Azoulay and Ophir 2012). Knowing that their 
stigmatization stems from deep political divides rooted in the wider conflict and its history, 
Palestinian exposed “equality” as a settler colonial mirage that distracts from deeper struggles 
for historical justice (Jamal 2011). But outside political parties and activist circles, many 
simply turn to a resigned political mood and pragmatic thinking. Part of this trajectory is the 
question of how to make most out of a city such as Tel Aviv despite an ongoing conflict on the 
national level. Tactics of immersive invisibility are one pragmatic answer to this question, 
allowing middle class citizens to participate in the city’s economy and lifestyle as anonymous 
“strangers”. 
 
Anonymous together 
Tel Aviv disallows some forms of visibility for Palestinian citizens, but it also enables other 
forms that make invisibility desirable in relation to other Palestinians. Meeting Hisham at his 
family house in Tur‘an, a small town in the north, he explained, “If I come in shorts from Tel 
Aviv, I won’t wear them here. Or if I had a beer in Tel Aviv, I wouldn’t take one with me 
when I drive home. I wouldn’t kiss my girlfriend on the street here, or hug her. In Tel Aviv all 
these things are easier.” Psychologist Muna, who hid her necklace from Jewish clients, said 
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that she had much balancing to do between Tel Aviv and the home town she visited almost 
every weekend: “Here and there are things I have to give up.” In Tel Aviv, the main sacrifice 
was political “normalization,” the pressure to hide political opinions. But she added, “There 
are things I won’t feel comfortable doing in the village. (…) there is something good about Tel 
Aviv: the secular liberal people.” However, access to this “liberalism” required sacrifices, as 
Hisham’s father put it: “Tel Aviv wants to be a liberal town, the good way of life. But we are 
talking about lots of discrimination too.” 
Palestinian citizens often contrasted Tel Aviv, nicknamed “The Bubble,” with “tense” 
and “divided” Jerusalem. The image of a liberal bubble invited Palestinians with the right 
aspirations and privileges to take advantage of its qualities. As the actor and musician Mira 
Awad put it during a meeting in the city, Tel Aviv is a bubble “where you can sometimes rest, 
from the political, from the absorbed life that we have.” This perception of an ostensibly 
apolitical city where the burden of identity and ethno-national conflict weighs less heavily on 
their shoulders was widespread among educated Palestinians in Tel Aviv. 
For example, marketing expert Kheir had studied and worked in Tel Aviv for 13 years 
at the time of our first meeting, held on a late morning in a restaurant. While ordering a glass 
of sparkling wine over lunch, Kheir admitted she enjoyed some aspects of “liberal” Tel Aviv. 
Importantly for her, the city provided some distance from other Palestinians: “I think a lot of 
Arabs in Tel Aviv just like being anonymous in the city.” Such anonymity is a particular kind 
of immersive middle-class invisibility: the ability to remain unmarked as a Palestinian by 
Jewish Israelis and simultaneously undisturbed as an urban individual by other Palestinians. It 
is a form of invisibility by choice that is only accessible to a minority of privileged urbanites, 
like the “blasé attitude” (Simmel 2011 [1903]) of urban civility that serves citizens as a social 
lubricant by enabling impersonal coexistence despite differences (Sennett 2002). 
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However, as civility encourages self-restraint and “respect” over possible disagreement 
(Calhoun 2000, 256), it gains a unique dimension in this settler colonial setting. The flattening 
of differences between urban strangers, as it is ascribed to modern cities, stops at the settler 
colonial difference between “friends” and “enemies,” between colonisers and colonised. Thus, 
invisible immersion and anonymity only work for Palestinian citizens as long as they do not 
cross the parameters of “respect” imposed by dominant Israeli conceptions. As visible 
Palestinians, they cannot enjoy the city’s “impersonal” qualities. In Sennett’s (2002, 48) 
words, they are always the type of stranger that is “synonymous with the outsider.” 
Anonymous immersion allows middle-class individuals to access to jobs, rental spaces, and 
urban leisure. But because invisibility as a Palestinian remains a precondition, such immersion 
does not reach deep enough to create a sense of belonging and urban citizenship, which 
requires the freedom to express “difference” (Blokland et al. 2015). 
I first met Kheir through a group of highly educated and successful Palestinians in Tel 
Aviv, who held regular dinners in restaurants, where they listened to invited guest speakers 
and socialized. Many were the only Palestinian employee in their companies or the only 
“Arab” resident in their buildings. They had developed a sense of apolitical disconnection that 
had become the driving force of these often politicized gatherings. Tellingly, Kheir said she 
felt very little incentive to join the group when she first heard about it: 
I was a bit scared of suddenly meeting all these other Arabs. Here in Tel Aviv, we 
Arabs don’t know each other. [We] see that there are a lot of other Arabs, but they 
ignore it. They don’t really want to have a community within a community in this city. 
It is not what they come for. (…) We are anonymous together. 
The group had about 35 affiliates and usually met for dinner in Israeli restaurants, which 
created a sense of hypervisibility and individual discomfort for Kheir: 
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Once we met in a restaurant and invited [the politician] Ahmed Tibi as a guest. The 
waiters and the other guests stared at us, although we were in a separated backroom. 
When the men walked down with Tibi at the end of the meeting, chatting loudly in 
Arabic, walking between the tables, they attracted a lot of attention. People at this place 
saw thirty Arabs and probably thought: where did they come from? 
Such collective presence dissolved the civility and anonymity that characterized immersive 
invisibility: collective visibility represented politics, it was the quintessential elephant in the 
room. In part, this was an intentional departure from the routines of their Tel Aviv lives. “[In 
these meetings] we don’t talk about business, but we talk about community issues and 
politics,” explained Zaki, one of the group’s initiators, adding, “But outside of these meetings, 
in Tel Aviv, there is no sense of community.” 
As anonymity ends where visible Palestinian collectivity begins, the hypervisibility of 
such gatherings explains why some feel reluctant to participate in these gatherings. At the 
same time, Kheir’s personal life showed that individual immersion into the city’s life was not 
without difficulty either. When going out with friends, “Jewish guys” often approach her not 
realizing she was Palestinian, but then query her background and “accent”: “They then often 
ask, ‘Where are you from?’, And when I say I am Arab, they say, ‘really?!’” Kheir said this 
moment was usually the end of conversations, hinting at a dilemma between being 
misrecognized as a non-Palestinian Jewish immigrant, or being recognized as a Palestinian in 
distorting ways. It recalls Frantz Fanon’s description of “Negroes” in France, who found 
nothing more exasperating than being asked, “How long have you been in France? You speak 
French so well” (Fanon 1986, 35). 
Although anonymity offers a sense of control, personal interactions make the question 
of identity ultimately inevitable: either actively pretend to be someone else, or be stigmatized 
as a Palestinian. The limits of “anonymous” immersion also become visible when Kheir talks 
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about her early Tel Aviv years, when she had a Jewish boyfriend, saying: “It took us two years 
to realize, when it got down to the real issues, that we actually don’t know each other.” The 
immense societal pressure against such mixed dating makes tactics of immersive invisibility in 
Tel Aviv all the more relevant. 
Conviviality between joy and discomfort 
Urban anonymity and invisibility are a burden because they limit in-group conviviality and the 
freedom of expressing one’s identity visibly. This became clear as I crossed a street in Tel 
Aviv with Rima, a former student in the city, when she suddenly recognized friends on the 
other side. As if breaking out of an invisible cage, they screamed with enthusiasm and greeted 
and hugged each other. Alongside Samira were three Palestinian men. Standing on the 
sidewalk, soon all spoke Arabic. At one point, Rima said, “Wow! We are five Arabs here 
standing in the heart of Tel Aviv.” Then Samira ran onto the middle of the street, screaming 
“allahu akbar” (God is great), towards a shopping mall on the other side. “It’s like we are 
having a demonstration here,” one of the others said, and all laughed amid exaggerated joy 
that spread from this incidental gathering. Tellingly, merely meeting other Palestinian friends 
and speaking Arabic on the streets of Tel Aviv already felt like a demonstration. 
However, such joy can quickly turn to fear and discomfort. One of the men, who was 
gay and worked as a fitness trainer in Tel Aviv, looked familiar to Rima, but although they 
would later recognize each other as coming from the same town, they did not bring it up. “I 
didn’t want to scare him by saying ‘I know you from somewhere’,” Rima explained later. To 
protect his anonymity, he went by a name that could be either Arabic or Hebrew. Meeting the 
wrong person at the wrong moment can be risky for Palestinians in Tel Aviv, especially when 
aspects of their identity challenge dominant societal norms. 
On another day, Rima and I ate something in central Tel Aviv and this time it was her 
who used tactical invisibility. Sitting down at an outdoor food stall, we ordered two bottles of 
 15 
 
beer when Rima suddenly turned to me in shock: one of the waiters, she said, was from her 
home town. The convenient anonymity Tel Aviv provided faded and was replaced by 
unsettling exposure: she asked me to change her order from beer to water, saying it was a 
mistake. As I would learn later, both knew exactly who each other’s families were, but 
pretended not to. The young man took our order in Hebrew, and after a few minutes, Rima 
decided to break the ice. “Don’t we know each other from somewhere?” she asked the waiter, 
who smirked for an instance and then answered in Arabic: “Yes, we are from the same town.” 
Their small talk continued for about a minute, at the end of which she asked for his name. “My 
name is Adam,” he said rather hurried. After a few seconds of silence, he added that his real 
name was Ahmed. “But here I am Adam,” he continued, just before his manager told him to 
stop speaking Arabic. 
Here, Israeli pressures to be invisible as a Palestinian, by changing names and not 
speaking Arabic, manifest themselves in the same situation as gendered tactics of invisibility 
that safeguard privacy between Palestinians. There was much at stake for the Palestinian 
woman who ordered beer, if only the danger of undesirable gossip spreading in her home 
town. Another Palestinian woman who lived in Jaffa said that she could rely on her 
“Ashkenazi appearance” to remain anonymous. Such “Ashkenazi” refers to European “white” 
origin. So sometimes she spoke Hebrew in Palestinian shops in Jaffa, trying not to be 
identified as Palestinian, because of the shopkeepers’ nosiness about the personal affairs of 
young women like her. Rather than seeking recognition as a Jewish Israeli, this was an attempt 
to remain anonymous in the eyes of other Palestinians. This is different from dissimulation, 
which refers to members of marginalized groups that pretend to be members of a majority to 
ensure the survival of the group and its identity (Sözer 2014; Sachedina 2010; Kohlberg 1975; 
Virani 2011). Palestinian identity is not perceived to be under threat: individuals simply 
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realize that aspects of their identity, as an external “categorization” (Jenkins 2000), can limit 
their socio-economic possibilities and their mobility. 
Queer Palestinian activism is often associated with struggles for recognition that see 
visibility as an important strategy (Ritchie 2010). In a similar vein, the Palestinian alternative 
music scene in Israel insists on making its ethno-national particularity visible (Karkabi 2013, 
326). However, spaces of Palestinian nightlife and queer activism in Tel Aviv are often 
intentionally underground, one example being the regular club nights organized by al-Qaws, a 
civil society organization promoting gender and sexual diversity in Palestinian society. It 
supports a community of “individuals that are able to live and celebrate all layers of their 
identity” (al-Qaws homepage), opposing the idea that Tel Aviv offers “freedom” through 
assimilation. 
Its parties regularly took place in a South Tel Aviv club hidden in a side street, and the 
young Palestinian Mahmud often joined.4 Like most of the 300,000 Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem, he held an Israeli-issued “blue ID” that grants permanent resident status but not 
citizenship. This meant he could move around Israel and access jobs or education in ways that 
Palestinians living in the West Bank could not. Still living with his parents in a dense 
Palestinian East Jerusalem neighborhood, he carefully managed his visibility between there 
and Tel Aviv: 
The first thing I change when I move from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv are my clothes. I can’t 
wear everything in Jerusalem. So I change my clothes in the car. If you look into my 
baggage, you will find all kinds of things there. My shoes, T-shirts, pants, jackets, make-
up. 
Although not cross-dressing, he put on make-up and wore different clothes in Tel Aviv from 
those he wore at home. The evening we met he wore a white jumper, a long silver necklace 
and tight trousers. Having a car was a convenience that enabled him to change appearances 
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between the two places and manage different kinds of in/visibility effectively. Not wanting to 
be recognized as gay in his East Jerusalem neighborhood, and not as Palestinian on the streets 
of Tel Aviv, he used tactics of invisibility to balance these two worlds and the associated 
desires for recognition. Sadly, concealing Palestinian identity was a common theme in Tel 
Aviv’s nightlife because nightclub bouncers often prevented “Arabs” from coming in, which 
made spaces like the al-Qaws party all the more important. 
The party usually ended relatively early so everyone could return home. Mahmud 
preferred to get back later at night, “so people don’t see me,” as he tends to “forget” himself in 
Tel Aviv. “Then I see I am already late, my parents are calling; then I have to change my 
clothes, have to take off my make-up…It’s always hard to go back,” he said. Mahmud’s 
dilemma was that he could not be fully visible with his national identity and his sexual 
identity, neither in Tel Aviv nor in Jerusalem. The parties aim to reconcile this dilemma: 
“Imagine you are stressed all the time, you are hiding yourself, are not free. And when they do 
this party, you can do everything there, you can share your emotions,” Mahmud explained. As 
a spatially immersed, yet hidden bubble, it symbolizes a rare convergence of otherwise 
contradictory worlds. Outside of the club’s dancefloor, Palestinians in Tel Aviv must cope 
with recurring forms of discrimination and stigmatization. 
 
Responses to stigmatization and immobilization 
As the center of Israel’s urban economy, Tel Aviv attracts a large number of Palestinian 
commuters. Commuting is often the only option open to indigenous populations in settler 
colonial economies, who lack employment opportunities in the peripheries they live in, and the 
economic capital to live in the city. This spatial inequality also defines Israel’s territorial 
fracturing between a Jewish Israeli core and largely Palestinian peripheries (Yiftachel 2002). 
Consequently, many Palestinian citizens move in and out of the city. The software engineer 
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Faris, who worked in a technology start-up in Tel Aviv, experienced such commuting as 
discriminatory: 
Recently on the train, there were a lot of people around me. Then my phone rang and I 
picked it up, speaking in Arabic. They all stared at me and I felt how they went one step 
away from me. And when I approach the guard in front of the train station while talking 
Arabic on the phone, they always check me and ask questions. If I don’t (speak Arabic), 
they don’t. 
As a preventive response, Faris avoided speaking Arabic at the station and on crowded trains 
or buses, which are often full of soldiers in uniform and subject to frequent security checks. A 
history of violence turned spotting “suspicious” people on buses into traits of good citizenship 
among Jewish Israelis ( Pasquetti 2013). Tactics of invisibility help individuals evade 
discrimination and immobilization as they cross “thresholds” between social territories 
(Brighenti 2010). 
For middle-class Palestinians, moving in and out of Tel Aviv also involves the airport, 
where security staff racially profile them routinely (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011; Shamir 2005). 
Such measures ensure the routinized identification of citizens, which helps  states to control 
and to regulate mobility (Torpey 1998). One tactical response to that became evident when I 
approached the checkpoint at the airport’s outer rim in a taxi with a friend, a former Tel Aviv 
University student. The guards looked into her vehicle and asked a few routine questions in 
Hebrew, especially: “Where did you just come from?” She answered in fluent Hebrew, “we 
came from Tel Aviv,” which eased the way. On another occasion, however, she drove her 
sister to the airport, saying she had come from Umm el-Fahm, a Palestinian town in Israel. 
They had to step out of the car, which was searched thoroughly, and almost missed their flight 
after a heated dispute and lengthy interrogation. 
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Although protesting on site is always an option, passing unrecognized as a Palestinian 
avoids delay and is often more useful. Such tactical invisibility aids their social navigation 
within a “force field” – a rationalized regime of mobility – that moves or immobilizes people 
and influences their possibilities (Vigh 2009, 433; Baker 2016). Israel’s mobility regime 
polices the movement and spatial access of Palestinian citizens on the basis of their identity, 
which is equally true within Tel Aviv. The Tel Aviv University student Dania recounts her 
experience: 
From what I wear, my accent, and in conversations (…), the guards at the gates of 
university always think I am not Arab. But recently they began to request student cards 
from everyone. They always said hello and were friendly. But when they see my card 
and my family name, they realize I am Arab and ask me to open my bag. But before it 
was as if I was VIP, no one expected that I am Arab. 
The mobilizing effects of tactical invisibility ended with the request for Dania’s ID card, 
which reveals her family name. “VIP” usually refers to mobile people with access to exclusive 
places. But here it suggests that being VIP means not being visibly Palestinian. Wherever 
possible, Palestinian citizens employ tactics of immersive invisibility to respond to 
discrimination and immobilization. 
This logic of mobility-enhancing invisibility extends into the realm of the political economy 
more generally; from spatial into social mobility. This is particularly relevant given the 
aspirations of middle class Palestinians who seek professional success in Tel Aviv. In the face 
of recurring discrimination, some actively use tactics of invisibility and seek recognition as an 
unmarked equal individual. The hope is that Palestinian identity can become invisible as a 
disadvantaging trait, often by ways of education and hard work and the adoption of a liberal 
“meritocratic ideal” (Lamont et al. 2016, 265). Dania expressed her hope the following way: “I 
have to work harder by myself in order to catch up with the level of Jewish colleagues. I am 
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working hard so my marks will be higher than theirs and so I will stand out when I am looking 
for a job.” 
Dania hoped for a Tel Aviv that is “like New York or London, like cities where people won’t 
look at me as an Arab, as if I was from another time or not modern.” Yet as much as she tried 
to make this stigma invisible through exceptional success, she worried about not succeeding 
after all: “There are still difficulties. Maybe I will be in the same position as the Jewish 
classmate, even more exceptional, even on a higher scale, of better quality. (…) the fear is that 
despite all efforts I invest, they will prefer someone who went to the [Israeli] army.” 
Towards the end of our conversation at university, after speaking Arabic for an hour, Dania 
looked around and said that most Israeli students probably found it “strange” to hear her speak 
Arabic. On the other hand: “They often praise me, saying, ‘You don’t look Arab’. But for me 
that’s not a compliment.” The dilemma was that neither was truly satisfying: being stigmatized 
as a Palestinian, or being congratulated for being invisible as such.  
To borrow in wording from Ghassan Hage, Tel Aviv “instils” in middle class Palestinian 
citizens the aspiration of universality (as an unmarked individual), but it “denies them this 
aspiration the very moment it encourages them to aspire to it and believe that they are entitled 
to it”; they have to “endure both the hope and the shattering of hope” as part of this process 
(Hage 2011, 121). A similar pattern is mirrored by three Palestinian citizens in Rabinowitz’s 
monograph Overlooking Nazareth (1997, 184), who were “champions of meritocracy, 
professionalism, hard work, universalistic pluralism, freedom of individual choice (…).” They 
gained distance from collective political issues in exchange for opportunities and success. 
According to Rabinowitz, “the bidding structure of Israeli liberalism” depoliticizes 
Palestinians. Frequent Israeli demands for Palestinians to be “good Arabs” follow this pattern 
– good Arabs are “moderates” who do not take nationalist positions and accord legitimacy to 
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Israel’s existence and its actions (Cohen 2011, 3). “Good Arabs” are essentially invisible as 
Palestinians. 
Overall, Palestinian citizens who seek social and spatial mobility are caught up in a stream of 
seemingly opposing currents. One of these necessitates the careful management of their 
visibility and another constantly pushes their Palestinian identity onto the surface. From the 
pragmatic standpoint of prioritizing mobility and agency over visible protest, the rationale 
appears to be along the lines of what Inas Said, a Palestinian entrepreneur in Israel, said about 
Palestinians in Tel Aviv: “It is a catch-22. Their only chance to find a job is to be 
individualistic. (…) As an Arab activist, of course I want them to have more rights. But on the 
other hand, I don’t want to be the person causing them to lose the last opportunity they have.” 
In a similar vein, Dania said: “I am not coming here to claim the rights of my land and so on. 
This will take place elsewhere.” 
The question remains whether the mundane tactics and aspirations of people who face severe 
restrictions on making visible collective claims nevertheless include claims, however subtle 
and invisible they are. Could not every position and access gained, or recognition achieved, 
become a stepping-stone for further claims? Indeed, some vulnerable people can only make 
gains through quiet “structural encroachments” that nevertheless challenge norms, even if not 
directly or openly (Bayat 2013, 18). A case in point are female Palestinian citizens who leave 
their home towns and immerse themselves into mixed Arab-Jewish cities such as Haifa, 
thereby achieving small-scale “micropolitical changes” with cumulative effects (Herzog 
2009).  
Meeting Dania in 2017, four years after our first conversation at university, it became evident 
that she had a sense of long-term achievement. “Maybe all this success happened because I 
always had this fear,” said Dania, who now felt that she was finally in Tel Aviv “because it’s a 
choice, not just a need. In the past it was a need and a question of access.” 
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Looking back at the years since she started her studies, Dania added: “My parents always told 
me to be realistic, that I will go back to the village, and that I won’t be accepted as an Arab in 
these firms in Tel Aviv.” Numerous internships, skills trainings and jobs later, she felt ready to 
open up her own business in Tel Aviv, saying: “I was so scared that Jewish people will always 
be better and valued higher than me. But now I am setting the grades myself. All of this 
journey made me more confident in my career. I did a lot of things I didn’t even like. Now I 
am able to be me.” 
Sometimes settler colonial cities require people to be visible as “someone else” for a while 
until they reach the position, confidence and aspiration that allows them to realize a new “me”. 
Sometimes, one needs a long journey to arrive at home. For Palestinian citizens with high 
ambitions, Tel Aviv is such a journey. Stigmatization and fear of discrimination triggered a 
long uphill struggle in Dania. Yet it also led to a sense of emancipation and independence, 
however limited this may be. No matter how much Palestinians tried to evade discrimination, 
conflict and tension recurred in many daily situations: especially under the impact of violent 
conflict and nationalist polarization, their fragile balance often reached a tipping point. 
Dangerously visible 
In July 2014 I sat in a bustling Tel Aviv coffee shop with Yazid, a Palestinian citizen of Israel 
who studied nursing. Another round of fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip 
had escalated into a full-fledged conflict only days earlier. Between the Israeli bombardments 
of Gaza and militants’ rocket fire into Israel, the war had toppled Palestinian citizens’ fragile 
balance between their identity and immersion; between political solidarity and a daily life 
surrounded by Jewish Israeli society. 
“Israelis usually don’t confront me with their opinions, but now it all comes out,” said Yazid 
about the impact of violence and polarization. We had just begun talking when the sound of 
the city’s alarm siren interrupted us. The waiters hectically guided customers into a nearby 
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residential building for shelter. As the wailing siren saturated the city, Yazid and I stood 
quietly without uttering a word – especially not in Arabic – until we heard the dull sound of an 
explosion, indicating that the rocket was intercepted above the city. As if it was all part of a 
planned choreography, the city returned to business as usual as quickly as it had sought shelter 
a minute before.  
Beyond this routinized surface, the impact of conflict and violence cast a sharp shadow over 
the city and the Palestinians within it. On the one hand, invisibility had become more urgent; 
on the other, much more difficult to bare. “I am afraid to talk Arabic now,” said Towibah, who 
worked for an NGO in downtown Tel Aviv, as we walked across a public square during the 
conflict. She added: “I reached a point where I prefer to talk in English instead of Arabic. I 
feel I am in danger.” These fears were not unjustified in the face of inciting speech by Israeli 
politicians and mobs of violent nationalists, one of which attacked the 31 year-old Wasseem 
and his friend on their way to an anti-war event in Haifa, where Palestinian citizens staged 
visible protests. “We spoke Arabic on our way to the demonstration and some guys came over, 
shouting ‘Death to Arabs’,” he told me on the phone after the attack. “They were screaming 
terrible things. I think they wanted to kill us.” They got away with a broken nose and minor 
injuries, but such stories spread quickly among Palestinians living in Tel Aviv. Their 
immersive invisibility became a source of protection for Towibah and other “lone” Palestinian 
individuals in this Israeli city. 
While the hearts of most Palestinians in Israel were beating for the victims of Israeli 
bombardments in Gaza, most Jewish citizens around them praised the very soldiers they 
disdained. Regular rocket alarm sirens intensified this tension and some Palestinians were not 
sure what to fear more, the incoming rockets fired by Palestinians in Gaza, or the often 
agitated Israelis they shared the shelter with. This had consequences for how safe it was to be 
publically recognized as a Palestinian.  
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Sami Abu Shahade, a former City Council member, faced one rocket alarm siren in 2014 
while shopping in a mall outside Tel Aviv with his children. Instead of joining others in the 
shelter, he decided to run “the other way,” fearing that others might confront them if they 
spoke Arabic. The dilemma many now faced was that simultaneous to the growing pressure on 
them to keep a low profile, they felt a growing desire to speak up. “It’s so bad. I feel that I 
can’t stand the Jewish Israeli society anymore. I can’t listen to them anymore. Not because of 
the Hebrew, but because of what they say, their conversations,” said Towibah. 
Whatever peak the Gaza-Conflict may have marked in terms of intensity, it was only a more 
spectacular version of the recurring pressures on Palestinian citizens to be invisible. The NGO 
worker Zahie from Jaffa once worked as a waitress in a shopping center. One day her manager 
hastily removed her name tag because it identified her as an Arab, after a suicide bombing 
outside the center that killed 13 people. As groups of Israelis began to gather in rage outside, 
shouting “death to Arabs,” Palestinian citizens were only safe if invisible as “Arabs.” 
At that time, Zahie did not yet wear a Muslim headscarf, or hijab, which is why removing the 
name-tag sufficed. But for women who wear the hijab in Tel Aviv, invisibility as a Palestinian 
was often impossible. According to Safa, who heads the NGO Zahie worked for, which 
supports Palestinian women from Jaffa to find jobs in Tel Aviv, many are scared of being 
attacked there. “There are also fears about being looked at, that they are not good enough in 
Hebrew, that they are wearing the veil and that it would be strange,” said Safa. Because many 
of these women do not fit into the image of outgoing “liberal” Tel Aviv, the only jobs they 
find are often in cleaning, hidden away in private residences or buildings. The capacity to 
control one’s visibility is tied up with such differences in gender, appearance, and class.  
Yet even for those who can otherwise use immersive invisibility, its empowering effects are 
limited during “times of adversity” (Kohlberg 1975, 395). These times do not only include 
violent conflict, but also Israeli memorial days and the “Day of Remembrance for the Fallen 
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Soldiers of Israel and Victims of Terrorism.” Its country-wide siren calls upon citizens to 
commemorate in silence. People answer this call by stopping their cars on the highway to step 
outside, by standing up in trains, offices, or classrooms. It is an all-embracing national ritual 
that troubles Palestinians and their visibility: do they stand up with the masses to blend in and 
retain ethno-national anonymity, but swallowing anger and frustration, or do they stay seated 
and drive on when all others stop and stand up, thus making their opposition visible? 
As the siren tries to synchronize everyone in the country, it expresses ideology as a force that 
“interpellates” or hails concrete individuals as concrete subjects (Althusser 2000; Handelman 
1998). It demands from people to identify themselves as supportive or resistant, synchronized 
or asynchronous. The actor and musician Mira Awad told me during one such Remembrance 
Day that it was similar to open conflict: 
Everybody is in tension. When you say something, they feel like you are attacking their 
own heritage and history. (…) Everybody is so over-sensitive, but also Palestinians are 
over-sensitive. A million and a half Palestinians inside Israel make a big effort not to be 
outside when the siren goes off. (…) We have a problem with the memorial of soldiers 
because we feel it is one-sided. So we don’t go outside. It is painful because we don’t 
get the same recognition. 
Overtly confronting Israelis during this ritual requires courage, but neither leads to more 
recognition, nor to less frustration. And so instead of protesting, most Palestinians in Tel Aviv 
hide when the siren wails. This political ritual weaves the wider context of Palestinian non-
recognition in Tel Aviv into micro-strategies of invisibility, whereby a lack of overall 
recognition makes invisibility both more necessary and more painful to endure. Many 
Palestinians in Israel would agree that taking off necklaces at work, or deliberately not 
speaking Arabic to security guards, was not a politically problematic move. But standing up 
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for a nationalist Israeli ritual was different. Not showing something was one thing, but 
showing political support for Israel was quite another.  
At least within their private sphere, some Palestinian citizens managed to arrange themselves, 
as did one man who lived with a Jewish boyfriend in Tel Aviv, saying: “I didn’t stand up when 
the siren wailed, but my boyfriend decided to go to the bathroom and commemorate there. He 
said, ‘I know you are Arab’. So it was ok that I stayed outside and didn’t stand up.” Some 
relationships, at least, seemed to reconcile the rigid difference settler colonialism inscribes into 
Arab-Jewish relations, despite high levels of tension.  
However, Palestinian non-citizens from the occupied West Bank have little freedom for such 
negotiations. As a restrictive regime confines them to another dimension of the city 
“underground,” they cannot move around freely, study at Israeli universities, or take part in 
Tel Aviv’s urban middle class lifestyle. While the main research behind this paper in 
2013/2014 focused on Palestinian citizens, it also involved research among some Palestinian 
workers from the West Bank; and a related research project in 2017 focused explicitly on the 
world of these Palestinian labor commuters. It seems important to delineate the limitations of 
immersive invisibility with the dull reality of some 120.000 laborers from the West Bank who 
worked in Israel proper or in settlements by 2017 (ILO 2017). At least 35.000 laborers had no 
working permits at all and were smuggled into Israel where they lived underground in order to 
avoid detention and fines. Invisibility gains a different connotation here, as one worker in Tel 
Aviv explained: “I can’t walk wherever I want. I won’t go to the beach, it’s too risky. If I 
don’t have work, I stay inside the mosque, where I feel safe.” To them, visibility is always 
“dangerously visible.” 
While moments of crises are recurring for Palestinian citizens of Israel, the Palestinian labor 
force in Israel is in and by itself constructed as a crisis: a “living emergency” and a dangerous 
population (Berda 2018). This enforces indivisibility through categorical exclusion, rather than 
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utilizing it for proactive urban immersion. Taking necklaces off will not reduce their waiting 
time at checkpoints, and situational tactics are unlikely to translate into improved positions 
that facilitate social upward mobility. 
Against this contrasting backdrop, the urban immersion of middle class Palestinian citizens 
reveals that seemingly universal categories of citizenship, success, mobility, and anonymity 
are highly contingent and conditional. This middle-class perspective complements dominant 
approaches that focus on the urban poor, their struggles, and their disempowering urban 
inclusion through a “politics of limited entitlements” (Di Nunzio 2017; Bayat 1996). Although 
middle-class Palestinian citizens turn temporary immersion into successes, recurring conflict, 
nationalist events, and political tension easily upturn the fragile balance they establish between 
such immersion and their identity. Ultimately, these flaws in middle-class urban citizenship 
mark the upper limits of their national citizenship; immersive invisibility reveals the hidden 
parameters of conditional minority citizenship. 
 
Invisibility as exile 
Settler colonial nations often shape cities in opposition to indigenous identity, thereby 
enclosing the settler majority in an exclusive space. Ongoing ethno-national conflict can mean 
that members of the majority further stigmatize minorities as potentially threatening Others. At 
the same time, neoliberal urban centres and their demand for labour act as a centripetal force 
that attracts indigenous citizens from economically marginalized peripheries. Through this 
process, historically shaped patterns of exclusion gradually become entangled with market 
forces and urban lifestyles that offer conditional pathways to temporary immersion and social 
mobility. Overt ethno-national exclusion transforms into a covert space of conditional 
immersion. 
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Yet immersive invisibility is also a powerful resource. It is one effective way of 
accessing “the ‘neoliberal city’ under the illiberal state” (Bayat 2012). Can immersion into the 
neoliberal city escape “illiberal” exclusion? The dilemma is that compliance with the terms of 
“neoliberal” urban immersion – depoliticized individualism, civility, and de-collectivization – 
eventually serves the illiberal logic at the same time as it pierces its outer shell: the desire to be 
an anonymous and unmarked individual goes hand in hand with the pressure to remain 
invisible within a settler colonial city. Instead of overcoming categorical difference and 
racialized exclusion, as is often assumed, urban neoliberalism and civility ultimately 
strengthen its grip. Close ethnographic attention to tactics of immersive invisibility reveals the 
affinity and interdependence between neoliberal and settler colonial politics of inclusion and 
exclusion. 
In its dual effects, immersive invisibility also undermines in-group networking because 
camouflage no longer works once visible collectives are formed. This hints at the important 
difference between immersion and urban inclusion: one can be immersed as a camouflaged 
outsider, but not permanently included as one. Immersion does not represent urban citizenship 
or an enhanced “right to the city,” which would involve more than the individual liberty to 
access urban resources: “a right to change ourselves by changing the city;” a common rather 
than an individual right that depends on collective power to reshape the processes of 
urbanization (Harvey 2008, 23). 
Despite remaining an individual project, immersive invisibility appears to enable long-
term socio-economic advantages and accords individuals some forms of apolitical recognition. 
This has implications for dominant approaches to (urban) minority struggles in neoliberal and 
settler colonial contexts, which are often portrayed in terms of visible “resistance” 
(Rabinowitz 2014; Gagné and Trépied 2016) or as a “battle for visibility” (Feldman 2008). 
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Although immersive invisibility hardly transforms the conditional parameters that limit urban 
citizenship, it can determine how much one can achieve within existing parameters. 
Two of this article’s central characters, Hisham and Dania, are cases in point. The 
student Hisham, who censored political visibility in return for internships in Tel Aviv law 
offices, benefitted from temporary immersion in the long run: another internship and about 
two years later, he co-founded his own law firm in Nazareth, the largest Palestinian town in 
Israel. It self-consciously advertised in Arabic on Facebook and catered to Palestinian clients, 
capitalizing on the skills and networks Hisham had acquired in Tel Aviv. Dania’s fearful 
“journey” through Tel Aviv’s discriminatory employment market eventually led to greater 
self-confidence, and as she put it, allowed her to realize a new “me” that was ready to 
transform the gained experience into her own business startup. These individual achievements 
may represent a transformative “alter-politics” that lies outside the dominant political 
imaginary (Hage 2015). 
Moreover, immersive invisibility allows stigmatized individuals to negotiate the 
multiple, often contradictory aspects of their lives and the associated claims for recognition 
beyond a politics of “difference”: recognition of their gender or sexual identity, as successful 
professionals, or as unmarked individuals. The double bind of settler colonial urbanism means 
that the visibility of one aspect of identity often requires invisibility of another. In this sense, 
tactics of immersive invisibility help people negotiate the ambivalence between identity 
politics, for which justice would require recognition, and class politics, for which justice 
requires economic redistribution (Sylvain 2014, 253; Fraser 2003). 
The dilemma is that invisible immersion into the settler colonial–neoliberal city only 
unlocks social and economic opportunities at the expense of ethno-national recognition; class 
politics and identity politics thus become mutually exclusive. It is true that multicultural 
legacies of classic settler colonial states, such as Australia, also perpetuate the inherited 
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unequal systems they claim to overcome (Povinelli 2002). However, they make inclusion and 
recognition of the colonized conditional on their fulfillment of authentic standards of 
traditional indigenous identity. Immersive invisibility does the opposite: it seeks to neutralize 
“authenticity,” rather than multiculturalism, in response to exclusive ethno-national liberalism. 
Such urban “ethno-liberalism” inscribes a logic of settler colonial “supersession” – that 
is, the displacement of indigenous peoples and their replacement with urban settler space – 
into the neoliberal dimension of a city, while an ongoing and unresolved ethno-national 
conflict undermines any attempt at a multicultural politics that would encompass indigenous 
citizens. Categorical exclusion from urban citizenship and individual self-regulation 
eventually develop a colonial-liberal affinity that is mutually reinforcing. Immersive 
invisibility thus becomes a space of continuing exile, a displaced state of in-between that is 
“sometimes chosen, sometimes not” (Hobbs 2014, 4). This exile symbolizes both resource and 
impotence, opportunity and entrapment: it is simultaneously imposed on people and adopted 
by them. 
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1 All names are real names unless indicated otherwise. 
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3 Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) counted only 18,500 “Arabs” in the greater Tel 
Aviv area, but about 15,000 of these were registered residents of Arab neighbourhoods in 
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